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LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENTS
LIABILITY FOR ACCIDENTS UNDER THE MISSOURI
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
BY ROBERT E. ROSENWALD
I. STATUTORY LIMITATION AND CONSTRUCTION
The rights conferred under the Missouri Workmen's Compen-
sation Law are statutory. No one can recover on account of
personal injuries or death except under the exact terms of the
law. The right arises because the law provides that "the em-
ployer shall be liable irrespective of negligence, to furnish com-
pensation for personal injury or death of the employe by acci-
dent arising out of and in the course of his employment."' This
clause is "declared not to cover workmen except while engaged
in, or about the premises where their duties are being per-
formed, or where their services require their presence as a part
of such services." 2 Except for the section which states that the
act shall be liberally construed,3 the authority of the Commission
and the courts is determined by the provisions to which refer-
ence has just been made.
The appellate courts can review only questions of law, and
may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the
award of the Commission, because the facts found by that body
do not support the award, or because there is not sufficient
competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the
award.4 This section of the Act has been construed to mean
that in cases in which there is disputed testimony, when the
Commission's findings of fact are supported by substantial evi-
dence, the appellate courts are precluded from weighing the evi-
dence on review, because the findings of the Commission have
the force and effect of a special verdict.5 In such cases the
1 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3301.
2 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3305 (c).
R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3374.
4 R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3342; Jones v. Century Coal Co., et al. (Mo. App.
1932) 46 S. W. (2d) 196, 198.
5 Hager v. Pulitzer Publishing Company (Mo. App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d)
578, 579; Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co. (Mo. 1931) 40 S. W. (2d) 601, 604;
Sawtell v. Stern Bros. & Co. et al. (Mo. App. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 264, 267;
Bise v. Tarlton et al. (Mo. App. 1931) 35 S. W. (2d) 993, 994; Conklin v.
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findings that the accident did or did not arise out of and in the
course of the employment are conclusive on appeal. On the
other hand, if the evidence is undisputed, the question is one of
law and not of fact.6 In those cases in which the facts are dis-
puted, it is immaterial whether the findings of the Commission
that the accident did or did not arise out of and in the course of
the employment are called ultimate facts or conclusions of law.
In either event, they must be supported by a sufficient amount
of competent evidence.7
With respect to definitions of the terms which are vital in the
scope of the employment clause under the Act, much has been
written,s but perhaps the most comprehensive statement of the
Supreme Court appears in the case of Wahlig v. Krenning-
Schlapp Grocer Co., et al.
It has been quite uniformly held that an injury arises
"'out of" the employment when there is a causal connection
between the conditions under which the work is required to
be performed and the resulting injury; and that an injury
to an employee arises "in the course of" his employment
when it occurs within the period of his employment, at a
place where he may reasonably be, and while he is reason-
ably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in
doing something incidental thereto. By declaring in sec-
tion 7 (c) that injuries to employees arising out of and in
the course of their employment, shall cover injuries to em-
ployees "while engaged in, or about the premises where
Pub. Serv. Com. (Mo. App. 1931) 41 S. W. (2d) 608, 612; Jones v. Century
Coal Co., et al. (Mo. App. 1932) 46 S. W. (2d) 196, 198 (the opinion in this
case can be justified only on the theory that there was disputed evidence;
Pfitzinger v. Shell Pipe Line Corporation (Mo. App. 1932) 46 S. W. (2d)
955, 958; Lefkomitros v. R. C. Can Co. et al. (Mo. App. 1932) 46 S. W.
(2d) 963, 964.
6 Sawtell v. Stern Bros. & Co. et al. (Mo. App. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 264,
267; See also Johnston v. A. C. White Lumber Co. (1923) 37 Idaho 617,
217 Pac. 979, 981; Ybairbarriaga v. Farmer (1924) 39 Idaho 361, 228 Pac.
227, 229; Atchison v. Industrial Commission (1925) 188 Wis. 218, 205 N. W.
806, 44 A. L. R. 1213, 1217; Lefkomitros v. R. C. Can Co. et al. (Mo. App.
1932) 46 S. W. (2d) 963, 964.
7N. 5 above.
8 Smith v. Levis-Zukoski Mercantile Co. et al. (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W.
(2d) 470; Howes v. Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co. et al. (1930) 223
Mo. App. 793, 22 S. W. (2d) 839; Cassidy v. Eternit Inc. et al. (Mo. 1930)
32 S. W. (2d) 75, 78; Metting v. Lehr Construction Co. (Mv. App 1930) 32
S. W. (2d) 121; Bise v. Tarlton et al. (Mo. App. 1931) 35 S. W. (2d) 993,
995.
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their duties are being performed, or where their services
require their presence as a part of such services," the Leg-
islature in our opinion, intended to extend the protection of
the law to all employees while in or about any premises
where they may be engaged in the performance of their
duties, and while at any place where their services, or any
act, task, or mission which forms a necessary part of their
services, may reasonably require them to be.9
In the recent case of Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co., the Su-
preme Court criticized this definition, saying:
, * * It is difficult to conceive of an accident arising out
of an employment and not in the course of it. . . There
is no justification for investing the words "arising out of
. . . his employment" with a technical meaning; they are
plain, ordinary, and everyday words, and should therefore
be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning. Every
case involving their application should be decided upon its
own particular facts and circumstances and not by refer-
ence to some formula.1o
The latest expression of the Supreme Court on this question
is fundamentally sound. Its adoption in a very recent Kansas
City Court of Appeals" case shows a tendency on the part of
the Missouri courts to determine each case according to its own
merits and upon its own peculiar facts, and not to adopt any ab-
stract formula under which the facts of each case are decided.
II. HOW THE LAW IS APPLIED
A. Accidents on the employer's premises.
In the case of Smith v. Levis-Zukoski Mercantile Co. et al.,
claimant, the widow of the decedent, Smith, sought to recover
for the latter's death under the Compensation Law. Smith was
a porter in the employer's building. His duties required him to
sweep, dust, run errands, and perform other occasional tasks
throughout the building. His regular duties were confined to
the second, third, and fourth floors. The evidence showed that
Smith met his death by falling down the elevator shaft after
9 (Mo. 1930) 29 S. W. (2d) 128, 130-131. See the criticism of the sec-
tion ef the act referred to. Howes v. Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards et al.
(Mo. App. 1930) 22 S. W. (2d) 839, 844.
10 (Mo. 1931) 40 S. W. (2d) 601, 605.
11 Sawtell v. Stern Bros. et al. (Mo. App. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 264, 269.
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sliding on the cable between the sixth and fifth floors. The
Court said:
*. . It should be particularly noted that the porters
had nothing whatever to do with sweeping or cleaning out
the elevators or elevator shaft, or cleaning the bottoms of
the elevators, all of which work was invariably done by
members of the engineering department which had the
elevators in charge.12
Accordingly, it was held that the mere fact that the employe
was killed by accident occurring on the premises near the regu-
lar place of service, did not establish liability under the Act and
formed no basis for the presumption that the accident arose out
of and in the course of the employment.
It was held that the deceased met his death in an accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment in the case of
Jackson et al. v. Euclid-Pine Inv. Co. et al.13 There the em-
ploye was a night worker in a garage. His duties required him
to serve as general caretaker and night watchman, to wipe,
clean, and wash cars, and to move cars about from place to
place inside the garage. The deceased started the engine of an
automobile in order to keep warm, and it was one of his duties
to dust out this same automobile. Death resulted from carbon-
monoxide gas. The deceased was found sprawled out on the
back seat of the automobile with a dusting cloth in his hand. The
Court held that the facts in the Jackson case clearly distinguished
it from the Smith case on the theory that the risk bore a rela-
tion to the employment, and that the exposure to such risk was
peculiar to the employment. The rule of law also set forth was
that a recovery under the Act will be allowed if the injury is re-
ceived while the employee is doing something incidental to the
employment, though not strictly within the limits of the duties
he is obliged to perform, even though the act itself may be pri-
marily personal, as long as it tends ultimately to react to the em-
ployer's benefit.
In the recent case of Ransdell v. International Shoe Company,
claimant, an employe in the trimming department of the defend-
ant's shoe factory, while working near the embossing machine,
12 (Mo. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d) 470, 471.
13 (1930) 223 Mo. App. 805, 22 S. W. (2d) 849.
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was called by an inexperienced operator and requested to make
the machine heat. In testing the temperature the machine trip-
ped, causing it to operate, and injuring claimant's hand. The
Supreme Court held that the claimant was entitled to recover on
the theory that she was performing a natural service for her
employer. 14 The Court referred approvingly to a Connecticut
case for the proposition that,
If a workman depart temporarily from his usual vocation
to perform some act necessary to be done by someone for
his master, he does not cease to be acting in the course of
his employment. He is then acting for his master, not for
himself. A rule of law, which puts such an employee outside
his usual course of employment, and so deprived him of his
right or compensation for an injury suffered, would punish
energy and loyalty and helpfulness, and promote sloth and
inactivity in employees. It would certainly prove detri-
mental to industry, and such a spirit of disregard of the
master's interest, if carried into all of the work, would, in
time, cripple the industry. 15
It is submitted that the decision of the Court was fundamen-
tally sound. The employe was performing a service for the em-
ployer, and therefore was acting in his behalf within the mean-
ing of the law.
In the case of Stone v. Pipe Co. et al., it was held that a fire-
man who was killed by a falling smokestack caused by a tornado,
did not meet his death in an accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, although his work required him to
stand in close proximity to the furnace at the base of the smoke-
stack.
The Court said:
. If such accident is the result of a hazard uncon-
nected with the prosecution of the work in hand, then there
is a lack of that causal connection which would bring it
within the terms of the act. . . The death of the em-
ployee in the instant case was due to the force of the tor-
nado, and was not peculiar to the employment that he was
engaged in, so that, while his death was occasioned in the
course of his employment, it did not arise out of it, and
therefore there can be no recovery under our Act.16
14 Ransdell v. International Shoe Co. (Mo. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 1.
15 Ibid. 1. c. 2.
16 Stone v. Blackmer & Post Pipe Co. et al. (Mo. App. 1930) 27 S. W.
(2d) 459, 460, 461.
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It was held in the case of Morris v. Dexter Mfg. Co. et al., that
the claimant, who had one finger frozen while loading spokes on
a railroad car for his employer, was not entitled to compensa-
tion for the loss of the finger. 1' The court recognized a great
diversity of opinions in the several states with respect to the
question of whether frostbite or freezing comes within the pro-
visions of the law. After reviewing several cases in other juris-
dictions, Judge Cox of the Springfield Court of Appeals con-
cluded:
In this case, the claimant loaded spokes onto a car in a
shed, then pushed them to a car which stood in the open and
unloaded them into the car. In this case there were other
workmen assisting plaintiff and doing the same kind of
work that he was doing, and none of them were frozen.
Plaintiff, evidently for some reason not explained, was more
likely to freeze than they, but it is clear that the character
of the work done by plaintiff did not make him more sus-
ceptible to freezing than his companions, or exposed him to
the severity of the weather to a greater extent than others,
in the same locality working in the open at employment of
any kind, were exposed. The commission found in this
case that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation, and,
since the evidence fails to show that plaintiff's work did ex-
pose him to the effects of the cold weather to any extent
greater than others in the same locality were exposed, it
cannot be said that their finding is not warranted under the
evidence.18
This case represents a radical departure from the rational
and sane approach to the Compensation Act which other courts
in this state have made. If a spoke had fallen on the claimant's
finger and severed it from his hand, the court would not have
reasoned that he was not entitled to recover merely because
spokes had not struck all of claimant's fellow workers. The
circumstances which resulted in the claimant's finger being
frozen, requiring him to work in the cold, were enough to show
that the risk resulted from a hazard peculiar to the employ-
ment. It is further suggested that all persons required to work
under circumstances exposing them to winter weather should
come within protection of the Act when frozen while perform-
ing services in the course of their employment.
17 (Mo. App. 1931) 40 S. W. (2d) 750.
38 Ibid. 1. c. 752.
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In the case of Cassidy et al. v. Eternit, Inc., et al., the Supreme
Court held that a hoisting engineer who was electrocuted while
climbing a ladder to the cage of an overhead crane to obtain in-
formation concerning his pay check, and acting upon the sug-
gestion of his foreman at the time, was not killed in an accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment, since the
foreman was not authorized to direct the engineer where to go
to receive the check. The court said:
Cassidy was entitled to pay for his work as an essential
part of his contract of employment, and had he been killed
accidentally while on his way from the place of his work to
a place where he had been directed to go by his employer
for the purpose of receiving his pay check, a different case
would be presented . . . But the accident under consid-
eration occurred at a place where he had gone, not to re-
ceive his pay check, but to get information concerning his
pay check, at the instance of one who was not authorized to
so direct him. And while the accident occurred within the
period of his employment, it did not occur at a place where
his services required him to be, nor while he was perform-
ing any duty of his employment. Nor was there a causal
connection between the conditions under which his work
was required to be performed and the accident which re-
sulted in his death. 19
The rule of law announced by the court is sound, although the
case involves a close question. It may be contrasted with the
case of Metting et ux. v. Lehr Const. Co., in which the Kansas
City Court of Appeals held that a laborer who had been con-
structing storage tanks and was killed when attempting to slide
down a rope in order to leave his employer's premises, was act-
ing in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
The evidence disclosed that other employees had used the rope,
and that some of them were and some were not instructed to
avoid the practice. The court said:
In the case at bar we are of the opinion that the act of
the deceased in attempting to leave his work in the manner
in which he did was not so wholly unconnected with and
beyond his employment as would justify us in saying that
it did not arise "out of" and "in the course of" his employ-
ment.20
19 (Mo. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 75, 79.
20 (Mo. App. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 121, 124. See in this connection Price
v. Kansas City Public Service Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 42 S. W. (2d) 51, 53.
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In a recent Kansas City Court of Appeals case, it was held
that a machinist employed by a street railway company in one
of its shops, who was injured by being struck in the eye with a
baseball bat thrown by a fellow employe, while playing indoor
baseball in the employer's paint shop, sustained a compensable
injury. The evidence showed that the employer knew of and
encouraged such games over a period of years. The employees
did not receive pay during the noon hour. The court, in effect,
sustained the contention of the claimant that by sponsoring and
fostering ball games the employer was raising the morale of the
employees and kept them on the premises, ready for an emer-
gency, should it arise. It was stated that "where an injury
arises out of a settled practice or condition known to the em-
ployer, with which there is a causal relation between the injury
and the employment, the injury is compensable." 21 The opin-
ion, couched in broad terms, is highly significant and sets a lib-
eral precedent for the courts of this state.
The cases to which reference has been made, seem to show
that the appellate courts in Missouri have given the Workmen's
Compensation Act a very liberal construction with respect to
injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment in
accidents arising on the employer's premises. 22 The one excep-
tion is the Morris case, supra,23 which ultimately may be over-
ruled.
B. Accidents off the employer's premises.
While it is true that technically the employer's premises ex-
tend to any place where the employe may be on a legitimate mis-
sion for his employer, 24 merely for purposes of classifying cases,
as used in this article, the term "premises" is limited strictly to
the employer's place of business.
In an interesting St. Louis Court of Appeals case, it was held
that a newsboy was entitled to the benefit of the Act for in-
juries received when he was pushed by a fellow employe while
carrying papers to the truck on which he worked, but that he
21 Conklin v. Public Service Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 41 S. W. (2d) 608, 614.
22 See also Lampkins v. Copper-Clad Malleable Range Corp. et al. (Mo.
App. 1931) 42 S. W. (2d) 941, which relates to a case in which the employe
unquestionably was acting within the scope of his employment.
23 See p. 238.
24 See p. 233.
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was not acting within the scope of his employment when he
threw a board at his co-worker by way of retaliation, thereby
sustaining additional injuries. The second injury arose in the
course of, but not out of the employment. 25 Clearly there was
no causal connection between the second injury and the employ-
ment of the claimant. The injury resulted from the actions of
the employe caused by his anger and not on account of his em-
ployment.
Missouri cases follow the generally accepted rule of law that
employees traveling to and from work in vehicles furnished by
the employer are acting within the scope of their employment
until they have arrived at their destination, whether it is the
place of employment, the employe's home, or a certain desig-
nated stopping place.26 Although the servant may be injured
while he is walking to the vehicle over a public road, after leav-
ing the premises where he has performed his day's work, the
hazard of using the highway is peculiar to the employment and
the employe in so doing has not departed from the scope of his
implied authority. 27 It is immaterial whether the transporta-
tion is furnished by a formal agreement or results from a prac-
tice in which the employer has acquiesced, as long as the servant
is acting under the master's authority, whether or not the trans-
portation is furnished on the employe's time, if it is an inci-
dent of the employment.2 8
The case of Wahlig 'v. Krenning-Schlapp Grocer Co. et al. is
authority for the proposition that a traveling salesman is acting
within the scope of his employment at all times while he is using
the public streets to call upon customers, because he is exposing
himself to a risk peculiar to people who use public thoroughfares
in connection with their business. The rule is aptly set forth in
the language of the court.
the duties of Wahlig's employment necessarily
exposed him to the danger of having his automobile struck
25 Hayes v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. et al. (Mo. App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 578.
26 Howes v. Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co. et al. (Mo. App. 1930)
22 S. W. (2d) 839; Sylcox v. National Lead Co. et al. (Mo. App. 1931) 38
S. W. (2d) 497.
27 Howes v. Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchards Co. et al. (1930) 223 Mo.
App. 793, 22 S. W. (2d) 839.
29 Sylcox v. National Lead Co. et al. (Mo. App. 1931) 38 S. W. (2d) 497,
500.
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by a train while driving in his automobile on and along
public streets and thoroughfares and . . . the injuries
. were the direct and natural result of a risk reason-
ably incident to his employment.29
In the case of Bise v. Tarlton et al., the St. Louis Court of Ap-
peals decided that a night watchman was engaged in a personal
mission when he left the premises he was patroling and crossed
the street to cash his pay check, being struck by a passing auto-
mobile as he was returning to resume his duties. The court
stated that "the accident did not occur either at a place where
claimant's services required him to be, nor while he was per-
forming any duties of his employment." 30
The defendant placed much reliance on the above case, in
Sawtell v. Stern Bros. et al., very recently handed down by the
Kansas City Court of Appeals. There the claimant, a bond
salesman with headquarters in Topeka, sold bonds wherever he
could find a customer. His activities were unlimited as to time
or place of sale. He came to Kansas City to confer with a pros-
pective customer, and after discussing the bonds, rode out to the
customer's house with her husband. A further discussion en-
sued, but the sale could not have been consummated on account
of the customer's absence. For this reason, the claimant walked
several blocks to his sister's, intending to return when the cus-
tomer had arrived at her home. As he was retracing his steps,
the claimant was struck by an automobile driven by a hit-and-
run driver.
The court held that the cases were clearly distinguishable be-
cause Bise had a definite situs where his work had to be per-
formed, and Sawtell did not. The claimants were workers in
different categories. The court said:
To remain in the course of his employment claimant was
not required to impose his presence continuously in the
house of his prospective customer, nor was he required to
sit upon the doorstep or to remain upon the premises as
though haunting the trail of a customer, and under the cir-
cumstances it was very likely more prudent that he tem-
porarily absent himself. He was confronted by a necessary
29 (Mo. 1930) 29 S. W. (2d) 128, 132. See also Nations v. Barr et al.
(Mo. App. 1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 858.
30 Bise v. Tarlton et al. (Mo. App. 1931) 35 S. W. (2d) 993, 995.
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interval of suspended personal contact with a prospective
customer, and if he adopted a reasonable and prudent course
to reestablish contact his employment was neither suspend-
ed nor abandoned. He was not laboring with his hands but
he was called upon to exercise all of his faculties as a sales-
man, and especially employ his mind upon means and meth-
ods of promoting his employer's business. . . Under
the circumstances, there was no deviation from the work
or the performance of any duty which he owed his employ-
er, and if the visit could properly be designated a deviation
it was merely incidental and claimant remained in the
course of his employment.31
It is submitted that the court arrived at a proper conclusion
in view of the facts of the case. The court considered the na-
ture of the claimant's business which was periodic, intermittent,
and discontinuous. This case is not only one of first impression
in Missouri, but sets a precedent for courts of other jurisdic-
tions. While somewhat similar issues have been passed upon
pro32 and con3 3 in several states, the exact point decided in the
SawteU case seems never to have been adjudicated.
Another recent case decides that a salesman who operated
over an extensive territory, and traveled in his employer's auto-
mobile, was acting within the scope of his employment when he
was asphyxiated in his own garage while changing a tire prep-
aratory to calling on customers. Speaking for the Supreme
Court, Judge Ragland said:
Leilich was not employed to change tires but to sell auto-
biles. But clearly the changing of tires in the circum-
stances shown by the evidence was a task incident to his
employment as salesman. Out of the performance of that
task the accident arose which caused his death.34
3' (Mo. App. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 264, 268.
32 See Harby v. Marwell Bros. Inc. et al. (1922) 203 App. Div. 525, 196
N. Y. S. 729; Gibson v. New Crown Market et al. (1924) 208 App. Div. 267,
203 N. Y. S. 355; Kahn Bros. Co. et al. v. Industrial Commission et al.(Utah 1929) 283 Pac. 1054; Parrish v. Armour & Co. et al. (1931) 200
N. C. 654, 158 S. E. 188; Livers et al. v. Graham Glass Co. et al. (Ind. App.
1931) 177 N. E. 359.
Is See California Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Accident
Commission (1923) 190 Cal. 433, 213 Pac. 257; Lipinski v. Sutton Sales Co.(1922) 220 Mich. 647, 190 N. W. 705; Southern Casualty Co. v. Ehlers
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929) 14 S. W. (2d) 111.
.1 Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co. (Mo. 1931) 40 S. W. (2d) 601, 605.
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The cases which have been considered relating to the right of
claimants to recover for injuries off the employer's premises are
more extensive and far reaching in their scope than those touch-
ing upon the same right for injuries occurring in accidents on
the employer's premises. They show a clear and decisive liberal
trend.
III. CONCLUSION
In the case of Howes v. Stark Brothers Nurseries & Orchards
Co. et al., it was said:
It is the manifest purpose of the Compensation Act to
compensate all accidental injuries to workmen arising out
of and in the course of their employment. Under the Act
the employee gives up a very substantial consideration for
the limited compensation assured in the Act. . . In
view of such substantial consideration yielded by the em-
ployee, the Act provides that the employer shall, without
regard to negligence, compensate the employee in a limited
amount for any injury received by him arising out of and in
the course of his employment. The Act should be liberally
construed in furtherance of that end. 35
In the case of Stone v. Blackmer & Post Pipe Co. et al., the
court said:
The purpose of all such acts was to place, as an expense
of operation of a business, the loss of efficiency in the use-
fulness of its employees occasioned by accidents arising as
an incident to the conduct of such business just as other
costs of operation are chargeable, but such laws were not
intended to insure employees against accidents that do not
so arise. While it is true that our act commands that it
shall be liberally construed . . that does not authorize
the allowance of a claim that lacks some of the essential ele-
ments required by the act.36
While there are doubtless a vast array of possible fact situa-
tions which the principles laid down in the opinions rendered
will not suffice to cover, the broad trend of the Missouri decisions
is definitely established. The courts of this state, youthful with
respect to the construction of a Compensation Law only recently
35 (1930) 223 Mo. App. 793, 225 S. W. (2d) 839, 844; approved in Conklin
v. Kansas City Public Service Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 41 S. W. (2d) 608, 612,
613.
36 (Mo. App. 1930) 27 S. W. (2d) 459, 460.
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enacted, have placed this jurisdiction in a category with other
jurisdictions which recognize that the Act must receive a fair
and liberal construction. One or two opinions may appear too
confining or unduly broad, but in the main the Missouri Courts
have stayed well within the confines of the guideposts they have
erected for themselves to determine whether an injury is, or is
not, compensable as one arising out of and in the course of the
employment.
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